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I recently satisfied a desire to jump out of an airplane. Soaring down 
from 14,000 feet at a speed of over 100 miles per hour, my thoughts turned 
to the possibility that my parachute would not open. Having been trained to 
think like a lawyer, I then began to wonder whether, in that event, my heirs 
would be able to pursue a claim against the company under whose auspices 
I was jumping, or whether that claim would be barred by the contract I had 
signed prior to boarding the airplane. That contract contained—in fact it 
pretty much entirely consisted of—an exculpatory clause in which I gave 
up the right to bring a claim against anyone remotely concerned with the 
skydive.
The moral problems that are often the hardest to solve are not those 
that involve the conflict between good and evil, but the conflict between 
two goods. Freedom of contract is generally believed to be a good thing. 
And so is the concept that one who acts negligently should be held respon-
sible for the injury caused by his or her act. The conflict between these two 
concepts arises when one party to a contract agrees to give up his or her 
right to sue the other party for negligence. We call such a term an exculpa-
tory clause. Here is an example of an exculpatory clause, taken from the 
skydiving contract:
6. “I” ABSOLVE THE RELEASED ENTITIES FROM ALL 
RESPONSIBILITY, LIABILITY & CLAIMS
Understanding the above Significant Risks & Dangers, I Forever Ex-
empt, Release, & Hold Harmless the “Released Entities” from all current 
& future responsibility, liability, duty of care, &/or claims arising out of 
any loss, injury, pain, suffering, damages, death &/or “Emotional Dis-
tress” while associating with the “Covered Activities”, even if it is the 
result of Simple or Gross Negligence, Oversight or Error.1
The reader will deduce that my concerns about the parachute not 
opening were soon alleviated. Nevertheless, upon my grateful return to 
* Frederick N. and Barbara T. Curley Professor of Commercial Law, Gonzaga University School of 
Law.
1. See Appendix for the complete agreement.
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earth, I decided to pursue my question about the enforceability of the ex-
culpatory clause. This article explores this particular aspect of aberrant 
contracts. It looks at the spectrum of views on the enforceability of excul-
patory clauses, ranging from “always enforceable” to “never enforceable,” 
with “it depends” firmly holding the middle ground. It concludes with a 
proposed framework for analysis of the problem, followed by an examina-
tion of the skydiving contract that inspired the endeavor.
I. THE VIEW THAT AN EXCULPATORY CLAUSE IS ALWAYS ENFORCEABLE
The view that bargaining for an exculpatory clause, like any other 
contract term, is a matter of individual liberty that should be left to the 
market is found not in the cases, but in the writing of economists. Judge 
Richard Posner, for example, states generally that “[e]conomic analysis, at 
least, reveals no grounds other than fraud, incapacity, and duress (the last 
narrowly defined) for allowing a party to repudiate the bargain that he 
made in entering into the contract.”2
In the narrower area of contracts for medical services between doctors 
and patients, Posner expresses the view that exculpatory clauses should be 
a matter of bargaining between the parties: “[I]t would often be rational for 
a patient to receive a lower price for medical service in exchange for sur-
rendering his right to sue the doctor for malpractice.”3 This view caught the 
popular imagination when it was suggested as a partial solution to the high 
cost of medical care in Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein’s book 
Nudge.4
In their chapter titled “Should Patients be Forced to Buy Lottery Tick-
ets?,” the authors assert that one way to reduce the cost of medical services 
is to allow patients to agree to give up the right to sue doctors and self-
insure instead.5 They argue that since the threat of litigation does not act as 
a deterrent, surrendering the right to sue would not result in increased mal-
practice.6 Moreover, if costs were reduced, medical services would be 
available to more people.7 Furthermore, this liberates doctors from practic-
ing expensive “defensive” medicine and makes them more willing to report 
errors, which would improve the practice of medicine.8 Of course, it is 
2. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 87 (2d ed. 1977).
3. Id. at 158.
4. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 207-14 (2008).
5. Id. at 207-14.
6. Id. at 210-11.
7. Id. at 211.
8. Id. at 209.
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possible that the medical provider would have it both ways—accept the 
surrender of the right to sue but not reduce the cost. Supposedly the market 
would take care of that problem.
This proposal was subject to criticism by Tom Baker and Timothy B. 
Lytton, who were concerned that, under the proposal, consumers could be 
exploited because of a lack of bargaining power, asymmetry of infor-
mation, a high demand for services, and the status of physicians. But they 
were also concerned that even the consumer who understood the transac-
tion would not make a rational choice because of behavioral economics—
people make choices that are not in their best interests because of a prefer-
ence for immediate gratification and overconfidence.9 Finally, the provi-
sion would have a deleterious effect because exculpation undermines the 
deterrent effect of tort liability.10
These criticisms mirror the concerns expressed by courts when strik-
ing exculpatory clauses as either unconscionable or contrary to public poli-
cy. We now turn to the approaches of the courts that have taken the “it 
depends” view of enforcement.
II. THE VIEW THAT AN EXCULPATORY CLAUSE MAY OR MAY NOT BE 
ENFORCEABLE
Analysis of unconscionability is frequently broken down into proce-
dural unconscionability—how the contract came into being, and substan-
tive unconscionability—the unfairness of the term. In the classical 
construct both factors are necessary for a finding of unconscionability.11
A. Procedural Unconscionability
Most of the time, the exculpatory clause is going to be found in a con-
tract of adhesion. But as the courts say ad nauseam, that is not enough to 
establish unconscionability, even procedural unconscionability.12 As Karl 
Llewellyn noted, one issue is consent.13 A person consents to the dickered 
terms of the contract, but except from an objectivist perspective, one does 
not consent to terms one is not aware of.14
9. Id. at 235-40.
10. Id. at 240-46.
11. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
12. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 302 (4th ed. 2004).
13. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON-LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370-71 (1960). 
14. Id. This problem was captured nicely in an exchange in an episode of South Park:
Kyle: You guys. You gotta help me. Those business-casual G-men are trying to kidnap me.
Stan: What?
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In the context of the doctor/patient exculpatory clause, Thaler and 
Sunstein address this problem as one of choice:
We recognize that patients might find it hard to understand the nature of 
medical malpractice liability and the consequences of waiver. Waiving 
liability should not be done lightly or impulsively. In other domains, this 
view is reflected in state law, which often requires waivers to be accom-
panied by procedural safeguards designed to ensure that the waiving par-
ty is fully informed. Waivers generally must be in writing and must state 
precisely what is being waived. Most important, courts are usually un-
willing to enforce waivers that are hidden in small print in long con-
tracts.15
Baker and Lytton raised the concern that patients would be unable to enter 
these contracts with doctors in a meaningful way.16 The problem for the 
drafter is to demonstrate what we might call “knowing consent” on the part 
of the consumer. But in a compelling case, it is not difficult for a court to 
find that the language of the contract, or the circumstances in which it were 
entered, did not provide for a sufficient consent.17
Drafters have largely learned not to hide the allegedly unconscionable 
term in fine print in the middle of the contract, but to objectively call it to 
the attention of the other party. There are many ways to accomplish this 
task. Some require the other party to affirmatively write a statement to the 
effect that “I have read and understood this contract.”18 It seems to me it 
would be better to state the provision conspicuously in bold language on 
the front page of the agreement, or as a separate check box online, so if the 
party sees nothing else, he or she at least sees that one.
Some courts, eager to find for the injured plaintiff, will not enforce an 
exculpatory clause stated in general terms because it does not warn the 
Kyle: It’s crazy, dude! They’re saying it’s because I agreed to the latest terms and condi-
tions on iTunes.
Stan: Why? What did the terms and conditions for the last update say?
Kyle: I don’t know! I didn’t read them!
Butters: You didn’t read them?
Kyle: Who the hell reads that entire thing every time it pops up?
Stan: I do.
Craig: Me, too.
Kyle: You’re telling me that every time you guys download an update for iTunes you read 
the entire terms and conditions?
Jimmy: Of course.
Butters: Well, how do you know if you agree to something if you don’t read it?
South Park: Humancentipad (Comedy Central television broadcast Apr. 27, 2011), available at 
http://www.southparkstudios.com/full-episodes/s15e01-humancentipad.
15. Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 212.
16. Tom Baker & Timothy D. Lytton, Allowing Patients to Waive the Right to Sue for Medical 
Malpractice: A Response to Thaler and Sunstein, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 233, 235-240 (2010).
17. See, e.g., Broemmer v. Abortion Serv. of Phx., 840 P.2d 1013, 1017 (Ariz. 1992).
18. See, e.g., App. at para. 10.
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person specifically what might happen.19 Such a ruling leads the drafter to 
try to enumerate everything that might possibly go wrong.20 Of course, the 
drafter is then caught between the Scylla of unspecified dangers and the 
Charybdis of unreadable language. Courts are also more likely to find that 
the provision is not procedurally unconscionable if there is a market for the 
particular service, so that the person did not have to obtain it from this par-
ty.21 Similarly, if the service is not a necessity, then the person had the 
alternative of not entering into the contract at all.
19. See, e.g., Bennett v. U. S. Cycling Fed’n, 193 Cal. App. 3d 1485 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (refus-
ing to grant summary judgment to defendant).
20. Here, for example, is language from the exculpatory clause commonly used in contracts for 
whitewater rafting:
I understand and acknowledge that the enjoyment and excitement of adventure activities is 
derived in part from inherent risks incurred by activity beyond the accepted safety of life at 
home or in my normal day to day activities and that these inherent risks contribute to my en-
joyment and excitement and are an integral reason for my participation in this activity. I un-
derstand that such risks simply cannot be eliminated without jeopardizing the essential 
qualities of the activity. I also understand and acknowledge that failing to use or properly 
use safety type equipment increases my risk of injury or of not surviving an accident or in-
cident while rafting.
The inherent risks associated with the rafting trip in which I am about to participate include, 
but are not limited to: encountering whitewater rapids and changing water flows and the 
possibility that I will be jolted, jarred, bounced, thrown to and fro and shaken about during 
rides through some of these rapids or changing water flows; it is possible that I could be in-
jured if I come in contact with food boxes, oars/paddles, other storage containers, or other 
fixed equipment necessary to the operation or outfitting of the raft; there may be errors in 
food storage or preparations; I recognize there are foot cups or foot holds in watercraft 
which may assist in stabilizing or holding myself or others in the watercraft but which may 
present an increased risk of knee, ankle or other injury as a result of restricted movement; 
the raft may break down or be faulty; it is possible that loss of control of the raft could occur 
resulting in collision or capsizing or sinking and that if a raft turns over or flips I could be 
“washed” overboard; rafts are slippery when wet and are naturally unstable so that I could 
slip and fall or be knocked out of the raft even in flat or non-moving water; while in the wa-
ter I may become disoriented, panicked and/or experience trauma from rocks, boulders, etc.; 
I can slip or fall during hiking or portaging or getting to and from the raft and I understand 
that the areas in which I might hike sometimes hide dangerous obstacles such as tree wells, 
tree stumps, creeks, rocks and boulders, forest dead fall, etc.; the raft or any portion of it 
may collide with or encounter other rafts, man-made or natural objects including submerged 
or semi-submerged trees, rocks, branches, boulders, bridges, etc.; accidents can occur get-
ting on and off the raft; changing weather conditions, storms or even lightening are possible; 
exposure to the natural elements can be uncomfortable and/or harmful and I am aware that 
this exposure could cause sunburn, dehydration, heat exhaustion, heat stroke, heat cramps or 
fatigue, some or all of which may diminish my or the other participants’ ability to react or 
respond; I understand that prolonged exposure to cold water can result in “cold water im-
mersion” syndrome or “cold shock,” hypothermia and in extreme cases death; I may en-
counter dangerous wildlife, insects, etc.; communication in the river terrain in which this 
activity occurs is always difficult and in the event of an accident, rescue and medical treat-
ment may not be immediately available. I acknowledge that I AM ULTIMATELY 
RESPONSIBLE for my own safety during my participation in N.A. events/activities.
Noah’s Ark Rafting Release Form (2010), available at http://augusta.younglife.org/Documents/noah—
s_ark_rafting_release_form.pdf.
21. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 758 passim (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1989).
384 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 89:1
Perhaps the solution to the problem of contractual assent is to have a 
statute that prescribes a safe-harbor form for giving knowing assent to an 
exculpatory clause. The Uniform Law Commission may take on the pro-
ject. But unless the form created an irrebuttable presumption of enforcea-
bility, it would only create a problem of circularity. A court would be free 
to rebut the presumption of enforceability by demonstrating that the trans-
action lacked procedural unconscionability because of the way in which the 
person came to sign the form. The drafter who overcomes the hurdle of 
procedural unconscionability then has to address the issue of substantive 
unconscionability.
B. Substantive Unconscionability
A court has the power to strike oppressive clauses on the grounds that 
they are substantively unconscionable—terms that are so oppressive that no 
reasonable person would make them and no fair and honest person would 
accept them.22 For this purpose, it would not seem to matter whether the 
term was found in a contract of adhesion or a negotiated contract, or 
whether it is hidden or not—if the term is that bad, then the policy is that 
the parties should not have to agree to it, period. To use Irving Younger’s 
example, if we do not want Isaac to exchange his birthright for a bowl of 
pottage, then it does not matter whether or not the term appeared in flash-
ing red lights on the front page of the contract or whether he could have 
obtained the pottage elsewhere.23 A court often finds procedural uncon-
scionability a useful tool because it excuses the court from having to an-
swer the difficult question—exactly what is the harm done by the offensive 
clause?
If the term is unfair, we may nevertheless allow it in a negotiated con-
tract. Contracts are, of course, a bargain, so if a person affirmatively bar-
gained for a term that would initially appear to be substantively 
unconscionable, it must be seen in the context of what the person got in 
return. Thus, the substantively unconscionable term may be permitted in a 
negotiated contract because presumably the individual agreeing to it got 
something in return. But our economist friends would say the same bargain 
occurs even in the non-negotiated agreement. When Ms. Williams agreed 
to the cross-collateralization clause in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furni-
22. See, e.g., Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, (1751) 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100.
23. Irving Younger, A Judge’s View of Unconscionability, 5 U.C.C. L.J. 348, 349 (1973) (refer-
ring to Genesis 27). Younger got a bit confused and writes that “Isaac purchased Esau’s birthright.” Id.
Jacob impersonated Esau in order to get Isaac to give the birthright to him, which makes the conduct 
even worse.
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ture Co., she agreed to something that looks oppressive out of context, but 
the store will claim that these are the only circumstances in which it is will-
ing to extend credit.
The difficulty of enforcing even an apparently negotiated exculpatory 
clause is shown in the New Jersey experience. In Kuzmiak v. Brookchester, 
Inc.,24 the court refused to enforce an exculpatory clause in a residential 
lease, recognizing the lack of bargaining power between landlord and ten-
ant due to the scarcity of housing.25 Quick on the uptake, a New Jersey 
landlord (or more likely the landlord’s attorney) drafted a lease in which 
the tenant purportedly bargained for a lower rent in return for an exculpato-
ry clause. In Cardona v. Eden Realty Co., Inc.,26 the court described the 
situation as follows:
In addition to this purported exculpation of defendant from its acts of 
negligence, the lease also contained a novel provision in which the land-
lord recited that it had no public liability insurance and if the tenant de-
sired to eliminate the exculpatory clause, written notice thereof should be 
given the landlord, in which event the rent would be increased $2 a 
month. The agreement went on to say that following termination of the 
exculpatory clause by the tenant, the landlord’s liability ‘shall be that 
provided by the general laws of the State. The landlord Shall not become 
an insurer by vitrue [sic] of such termination.’27
The trial court fell for this ploy, finding that the evident bargaining of 
the parties removed the case from the Kuzmiak line of cases that made lack 
of bargaining power grounds for refusing to enforce the exculpatory 
clause.28 The Appellate Division was not so gullible, however. Based only 
on its examination of the lease, it found that in fact the tenant lacked bar-
gaining power:
We are uninformed as to the circumstances under which the lease was 
signed, except that the record indicates the tenant was not represented by 
counsel and that the landlord’s manager was an attorney. However, the 
lease in its entirety reveals that the landlord was in an eminently superior 
bargaining position. The lease included provisions which clearly support 
this conclusion: no interest was to be paid on security deposits; the tenant 
(as well as the landlord) waived trial by jury in any action brought by ei-
ther against the other on any matters arising out of or in any way con-
nected with the tenant’s use or occupancy of the premises or the common 
stairways, halls, sidewalks, etc.; the tenant waived any exemptions the 
24. 33 N.J. Super. 575 passim (App. Div. 1955).
25. Most jurisdictions have by statute prohibited exculpatory clauses in residential leases. See, 
e.g., UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 1.403(a)(4) (1972). In general, the only
consequence for including an exculpatory clause in a contract is that it is unenforceable. Under the 
Uniform Act, however, there are penalties for a knowing inclusion. Id. at § 1.403(b).
26. 118 N.J. Super. 381, 381-82 (App. Div. 1972).
27. Id. at 383.
28. Id.
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law gave him on a distress for nonpayment of rent, and the lease at-
tempted to release defendant from the responsibility of maintaining the 
building in good repair, contrary to N.J.S.A. 55:13A-1 et seq.
While it is conceivable that even in some noncommercial transactions a 
landlord and tenant might properly negotiate a lease to rent property ‘as 
is’ and in consideration of a reduced rental the tenant assume all liability 
for repairs and insurance coverage, it is clear that in this multiple-tenant 
tenement house lease, the provisions thereof were oppressively for the 
benefit of the landlord and against public policy.
The tenant’s option as to the landlord’s liability did not convert their ob-
viously unequal bargaining positions into equal positions, and the excul-
patory agreement, despite the method made available to remove it, is 
against public policy and should not be enforced. See Mayfair Fabrics v. 
Henley, 48 N.J. 483, 226 A.2d 602 (1967). The lease represents a legalis-
tic effort to circumvent the positive public policy of this State, and the 
clauses in issue must be held to be invalid.29
In an earlier part of the opinion, the court noted that the lease “re-
quired the tenant to furnish his own painting, stove, heat, heating equip-
ment, hot water, refrigerator, shades, screens, storm windows, toilet seat, 
door locks, and all fixtures needed in the occupation of the premises.”30 It 
seems to me these facts also support the court’s conclusion—the fact that 
you agreed to provide your own toilet seat is a pretty good indication that 
you did not have much bargaining power.
No doubt courts would greet an exculpatory clause in a contract for 
medical services as advocated by the authors of Nudge with the same skep-
ticism shown by this court. Faced with the strong possibility that a court 
would not enforce the exculpatory clause, the prudent doctor, like the pru-
dent landlord, would still need to obtain insurance coverage, thus negating 
the usefulness of the clause as a cost-saving mechanism. Courts behave this 
way because, as a matter of policy, they object to exculpatory clauses.
C. What is the Policy?
When a court has difficulty articulating the reason it is opposed to 
something, it cheerfully invokes “public policy,” rarely articulating exactly 
what that policy is.31 In the case of opposition to exculpatory clauses, there 
are two policies. One is that a person ought to be compensated for an injury 
caused by another. We will call this the compensation policy. The second is 
29. Id. at 36.
30. Id. at 35.
31. An English judge famously stated that public policy is “a very unruly horse, and when once 
you get astride it you never know where it will carry you. It may lead you from the sound law. It is 
never argued at all but when other points fail.” Richardson v. Mellish, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (Ex. 
1824) (Burrough, J.).
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the person ought to be compensated by the person who caused the injury. 
This partially satisfies our sense of justice and it also deters the person from 
causing further injury. We will call this the deterrent policy.
The deterrent policy is somewhat muddled by insurance, which allows 
someone other than the tortfeasor to absorb the cost of compensation. If the 
victim procures insurance, there is no deterrence, though the principle of 
subrogation would restore the balance by allowing the insurer to recover 
from the tortfeasor. But if the tortfeasor procures insurance, there is less 
deterrence. Perhaps our economist friends would say that the fact that a 
claim will increase the cost of insurance acts as a deterrent.
But there are other deterrents besides the cost of compensation or the 
cost of insurance. The toy industry relies not only on the threat of lawsuits 
to make toys safer, but also on the regulation of the Consumer Product 
Safety Commission. The work of the Commission is aided by the fact that 
even more than a desire to avoid lawsuits, the toymaker wishes to protect 
the brand.
A provider of bungee jumping has a similar incentive not to be negli-
gent because of the bad publicity that will result from an injury. Would you 
go to the provider with the perfect safety record or to the provider who had 
two injuries in the past year? With the availability of information through 
the Internet, consumers are in a better position to make such choices. In 
fact, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act provides for such a 
system of “physician quality reporting.”32
In California, the policies surrounding exculpatory clauses were care-
fully examined in a case involved an exculpatory clause in a contract for 
admission to a hospital. In Tunkl v. Regents of the University of Califor-
nia,33 the facts showed that “[p]laintiff at the time of signing the release 
was in great pain, under sedation, and probably unable to read.”34 In spite 
of these favorable facts, the jury found that the plaintiff was able to com-
prehend the effect of his act.35 Therefore, on appeal, the issue was whether 
the release was nevertheless unenforceable as a matter of law.36
California codified its law of Contracts when it adopted the Field 
Code in 1872.37 Therefore, the court appropriately turned to the statute that 
was arguable relevant. Civil Code section 1668 provides that “[a]ll con-
32. See P.L. 111-148 (2010).
33. 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1981).
34. Id. at 442 n.1.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Arvo Van Alstyne, The California Civil Code, 6 West’s Annot. Cal. Codes 1-43 (1954). See
also Scott J. Burnham, Let’s Repeal the Field Code, 67 MONT. L. REV. 31, 36-37 (2006).
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tracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone 
from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or 
property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are 
against the policy of the law.”38 This section has had a checkered interpre-
tive history in California, as discussed in Tunkl.39 Some cases used it to 
invalidate contracts that exempted liability for negligence. Other cases held 
that it exempted only gross negligence and active negligence, and not ordi-
nary negligence. Nevertheless, the cases consistently held that an exculpa-
tory clause is enforceable if it does not involve the public interest. The task 
for the court, therefore, was to determine what it means to involve the pub-
lic interest. The court restated the holdings of a number of cases to arrive at 
“a rough outline of the type of transaction in which exculpatory provisions 
will be held invalid.”40 As stated in a later case, Henrioulle v. Marin Ven-
tures, Inc.:41
In Tunkl, six criteria are used to identify the kind of agreement in which 
an exculpatory clause is invalid as contrary to public policy. “(1) It con-
cerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for public regula-
tion. (2) The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a 
service of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of prac-
tical necessity for some members of the public. (3) The party holds him-
self out as willing to perform this service for any member of the public 
who seeks it, or at least any member coming within certain established 
standards. (4) As a result of the essential nature of the service, in the 
economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation pos-
sesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any member 
of the public who seeks his services. (5) In exercising a superior bargain-
ing power the party confronts the public with a standardized adhesion 
contract of exculpation, and makes no provision whereby a purchaser 
may pay additional fees and obtain protection against negligence. (6) Fi-
nally, as a result of the transaction, the person or property of the pur-
chaser is placed under the control of the seller, subject to the risk of 
carelessness by the seller or his agents.”42
Importantly, this enumeration of the “criteria” makes it look as though 
the Tunkl court was enumerating elements that must be satisfied rather than 
factors that are to be considered. Tunkl itself preceded the enumeration 
with this language: “Thus the attempted but invalid exemption involves a 
transaction which exhibits some or all of the following characteristics,”43
clearly indicating that the court intended factors rather than elements. Nev-
38. Cal. Civ. Code § 1668 (2013).
39. Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 442-43.
40. Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 444-45.
41. 573 P.2d 465 (Cal. 1963).
42. Id. at 468 (citation omitted).
43. Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445 (emphasis added).
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ertheless, I think the Henrioulle court got it right, as the criteria build on 
each other. In essence, Tunkl provides us with a sophisticated analysis in 
which courts place transactions along a spectrum, with exculpatory clauses 
in the “private interest” transactions on the enforceable side of the spectrum 
and exculpatory clauses in the “public interest” transactions on the unen-
forceable side. In fact, the Tunkl court, while restating that “the agreement 
need only fulfill some of the characteristics above outlined,” nevertheless 
found that “here, the relationship fulfills all of them.”44
Courts have subsequently applied the “Tunkl test” to a number of 
transactions, proving it to be a workable approach to the problem of distin-
guishing between enforceable and unenforceable exculpatory clauses. In 
California, for example, the court refused to enforce an exculpatory clause 
in a residential lease in Henrioulle,45 but upheld an exculpatory clause in a 
contract for the use of an exercise facility in an apartment complex in Lewis 
Operating Corp. v. Superior Court46 and in a contract signed by a race car 
driver who was injured during a race in National and International Broth-
erhood of Street Racers v. Superior Court.47
Exculpatory clauses are commonly found in contracts for recreational 
activities. If the Tunkl test consisted of elements, then these clauses are 
likely enforceable because recreational activities would probably fail the 
public interest analysis and be found to be a matter of private agreement. In 
a thoughtful article, Professor Robert Heidt decries the effect that failure to 
uphold exculpatory clauses has had on recreational activities.48 He argues 
that under the Learned Hand test for negligence,49 all a plaintiff has to do is 
show that the provider of the activity could have taken some precaution 
that would have avoided or reduced the injury.50 Therefore, to prevent 
injury, the provider takes steps that weaken the experience for the sports 
enthusiast. Heidt argues that more expansive enforcement of exculpatory 
clauses would redress the balance.51
44. Id. at 447.
45. 573 P.2d at 466.
46. 200 Cal. App. 4th 940, 943 (2011).
47. 215 Cal. App. 3d 934 (1989; rev. denied 1990).
48. Robert Heidt, The Avid Sportsman and the Scope for Self-Protection: When Exculpatory 
Clauses Should be Enforced, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 381, 383 (2004).
49. Id. at 394 (citing United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) 
(“While negligence at one time meant failure to provide average care or failure to provide the care 
which would have been provided by a reasonable person, it has evolved to mean the mere failure to 
provide any cost-justified precaution. In their universal adoption of the Learned Hand test for negli-
gence, courts have implicitly assumed that a reasonable person would take every cost-justified precau-
tion.”).
50. Id. at 394-95.
51. Id. at 451-59.
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Heidt, however, would not protect the provider where the purchaser of 
the services lacks significant opportunity for self-protection.52 This is the 
final factor expressed in Tunkl: “as a result of the transaction, the person or 
property of the purchaser is placed under the control of the seller, subject to 
the risk of carelessness by the seller or his agents.”53 Under Heidt’s view, 
exculpatory clauses for a substantial number of providers of recreational 
activities—for example, sky diving, scuba diving, and bungee jumping—
offer no protection against their negligence because the purchaser has little
control over the activity.
III. THE VIEW THAT EXCULPATORY CLAUSES SHOULD NOT BE ENFORCED
In Boilerplate, Margaret Jane Radin uses exculpatory clauses as one 
example of a contract term that should be curtailed.54 Radin is unable to 
come up with a good explanation of why firms include exculpatory clauses. 
She suggests that they might be doing it because their insurers require it. 
Instead of procuring costly coverage, the firm shifts the cost of insuring 
against the involved risks to the individual.55 But this of course raises the 
problem of moral hazard—if a firm has no liability, then will it take pre-
caution against accidents?
Ultimately, the answer may be that because of the principle of free-
dom of contract, we should be indifferent to the reason a party seeks an 
exculpatory clause. But this argument proves too much. For some of the 
reasons pointed out by Radin, an exculpatory clause may appear to be un-
fair. So, in analyzing whether it is unconscionable, a court should take a 
cue from the Uniform Commercial Code and look at the clause’s “commer-
cial setting, purpose, and effect.”56 The proponents of exculpatory clauses 
may have done an inadequate job of articulating these justifications and, if 
assaults such as Radin’s have any effect, they had better get off the dime.
In the majority of states, the unarticulated policy seems to be the one 
articulated in Tunkl—in an area lacking public interest, the policy of free-
dom of contract outweighs other policies. However, if the policies of com-
pensation and deterrence are truly paramount, then there should be no 
distinction between the treatment of exculpatory clauses in areas of public 
52. Id. at 455-57.
53. Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 446.
54. MARGARET J. RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF 
LAW 138-39 (2013). The other members of her rogue’s gallery of terms are arbitration clauses, choice 
of forum clauses, and clauses waiving the right to bring a class action.
55. Id. at 138-140.
56. U.C.C. § 2-302(2) (2011).
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interest and areas not in the public interest. This seems to be the policy in 
Montana.
Montana is one of the few states that have broadly prohibited exculpa-
tory clauses.57 In Haynes v. County of Missoula, the plaintiffs lost two 
quarter horses when a barn burned down at the Missoula County fair-
grounds during the Western Montana Fair.58 The defendant County argued 
that the Haynes’s claim was barred by an exculpatory clause in the entry 
blank they signed as exhibitors.59
I assume that economists would say that the argument for the County 
is that there was a bargain something like this:
The County to the Exhibitors: We know that the fairgrounds are not in 
good repair. The County taxpayers will not agree to put up the money to 
make them safer. So you have a choice. Either we can charge you $500 
to exhibit in the fair and use the surplus money to improve the buildings, 
or we can charge you $50, and in return for that lower price you agree 
not to hold us liable for negligence and you will provide your own insur-
ance. Which will it be?
The Exhibitors (in unison): We prefer to pay $50.
Having made that bargain, the exhibitors came to regret it and looked to the 
court for relief. The trial court suppressed the release. On appeal, the court 
took note of the lack of uniformity in exculpatory clause cases, stating the 
obvious that the outcome is a matter of public policy. The court noted that 
one of those policies is that a person is liable for his or her negligence. 
Because Montana is a Field Code state, having taken the statutes from Cali-
fornia in 1895, the court looked to the statutes for those policies. One of 
those statutes, Montana Code Annotated § 1-3-204, contains the freedom of 
contract principle that “[a]ny person may waive the advantage of a law 
intended solely for that person’s benefit. A law established for a public 
reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement.”60 The court sensibly 
interpreted this provision as allowing an exculpatory clause in an area that 
does not involve the public interest. Without analysis, the court concluded 
57. Virginia also has a common law prohibition on enforcement of exculpatory clauses. See Hiett 
v. Lake Barcroft Cmty. Assn., 418 S.E.2d 894 (Va. 1992). Louisiana prohibits enforcement by a more 
opaque statute than was found in California and Montana:
Clause that excludes or limits liability
Any clause is null that, in advance, excludes or limits the liability of one party for intention-
al or gross fault that causes damage to the other party.
Any clause is null that, in advance, excludes or limits the liability of one party for causing 
physical injury to the other party.
La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2004 (2011).
58. 517 P.2d 370 (Mont. 1973).
59. Id. at 375-76.
60. Mont. Code Ann. § 1-3-204 (2011).
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that “[w]e hold the County is precluded from disclaiming liability by virtue 
of the release when performing an act in the public interest.”61
In dicta, the court applied the Tunkl test to determine whether the 
transaction was within the public interest. Without analysis, it declared that 
“[a] majority, and arguably all, of these tests are met in the instant case.”62
A closer inspection would probably have found that the transaction satis-
fied the last four tests; there is no doubt that the County used a contract of 
adhesion when exhibitors sought the services. But satisfying the first two 
tests is more problematic. Those tests are: “(1) It concerns a business of a 
type generally thought suitable for public regulation; (2) The party seeking 
exculpation is engaged in performing a service of great importance to the 
public, which is often a matter of practical necessity for some members of 
the public.”63
Is a county fair suitable for public regulation? More specifically, is it 
performing a service of great importance to the public—a matter of practi-
cal necessity? Is entering a horse for racing in the county fair analogous to 
obtaining medical care at a hospital or entering into a residential lease 
agreement? The problem with seeing the Tunkl test as factors rather than 
elements is that the first two factors go to the distinction between a “pub-
lic” transaction and a “private” transaction. Once you get past those two 
factors, the remaining factors simply state that the provider of the service 
had the bargaining power to require a person to agree to an exculpatory 
clause if they wanted the services—and this is true of virtually any transac-
tion in issue, whether public or private. Therefore, by looking at the Tunkl
test as consisting of factors rather than elements enabled the court to con-
clude that an exculpatory clause in a contract for exhibitors at a county fair 
was not enforceable.
Thirteen years later, Montana had another occasion to explore the en-
forceability of an exculpatory clause. In Miller v. Fallon County, Cecil 
Miller, the husband of the plaintiff Linda Miller, was a long-distance truck 
driver.64 Linda asked the company that used Cecil’s services if she could 
accompany her husband on a trip, and the company said that she could if 
she signed an exculpatory clause, which she did.65 She was injured in an 
accident on the trip, and brought suit.66
61. Haynes, 517 P.2d at 377.
62. Id. at 378.
63. Tunkl, 383 P.2d at 445.
64. 721 P.2d 342 (Mont. 1986).
65. Id. at 344.
66. Id. at 343-44.
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What followed was an amazing bit of lawyering by the plaintiff’s at-
torney in response to defendants’ claims for summary judgment. Montana 
had theretofore applied the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity, which 
prevented one spouse from recovering in tort from the other. Plaintiff was 
able to persuade the court to overturn precedent and change that rule.67
Having overcome this obstacle, she also had to persuade the court to throw 
out the exculpatory clause.68
The court made nodding reference to the decision in Haynes, which it 
acknowledged implied that “private parties are allowed to contract away 
liability for negligent acts if the interest of the public is not involved and 
the contracting parties stand on equal footing.”69 Unlike the Haynes court,
however, the Miller court did not apply the Tunkl test to determine whether 
accompanying one’s spouse on a trucking run involved the public interest 
or was merely a private interest.70 A cynic might say the plaintiff would 
have lost if the court had done so.
Instead, the court went back to the Field Code statute with which the 
California court had begun its analysis in Tunkl. In Montana, it is codified 
at Montana Code Annotated § 28-2-702:
Contracts which violate policy of the law—exemption from respon-
sibility. All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly, 
to exempt anyone from responsibility for the person’s own fraud, for 
willful injury to the person or property of another, or for violation of law, 
whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.71
The court observed that when a state borrows a statute from another juris-
diction, it presumably borrows the construction placed on it by that state, 
but this is a rebuttable presumption, and the interpretation of the California
Supreme Court in Tunkl was merely persuasive. Looking at the plain lan-
guage of the statute, the court observed that it forbids a person from ex-
empting himself or herself from responsibility for “violation of law, 
whether willful or negligent.”72 “What is law,” asked the court, and con-
cluded that it consists of constitutions, statutes, case law, and common 
law.73 The court jumped over the next step in its rush to judgment. Presum-
67. Id. at 344-45.
68. For purposes of the summary judgment motions, the court assumed that Cecil Miller was an 
employee of the company, and therefore the company was liable for his actions under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior. At trial, plaintiff would also have to overcome the obstacle of proving that he was 
not an independent contractor. Id. at 344.
69. Id. at 346.
70. Id. at 346-47.
71. Mont. Code Ann. § 28-2-702 (2011).
72. Miller, 721 P. 2d at 346.
73. Id. at 346-47.
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ably, the next step is to ask, “What does the common law say?” The answer 
is: it says that one owes a duty of care to another. The court then conclud-
ed: “Thus, pursuant to the clear and unambiguous language of § 28-2-702,
MCA, an entity cannot contractually exculpate itself from liability for will-
ful or negligent violations of legal duties, whether they be rooted in statute 
or case law.”74
With that deft sleight of hand, the court did away with the pub-
lic/private distinction embodied in the Tunkl test and ruled that no exculpa-
tory clause is enforceable. The unfortunate breadth of this decision can be 
seen in the author’s own experience. Attorneys in Montana would come to 
him for legal advice with their thorniest questions. He would say to them:
I would like to help you, but I want you to realize that I don’t do this 
kind of thing often enough to justify my purchasing malpractice insur-
ance. Therefore, I will agree to do it only if you agree to review my work 
and not hold me liable for malpractice.
They would of course agree. I cannot imagine a more private or more 
freely bargained-for agreement. Yet it would not be enforceable under the 
rule of Miller.
Do parties continue to incorporate exculpatory clauses in their con-
tracts in Montana? Of course. Hopefully the lawyers who draft them for 
their clients inform the client that the clause is not enforceable and advise 
them to obtain insurance, which may be difficult to find. Is it ethical for an 
attorney to draft an exculpatory clause knowing it is not enforceable?75
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(d) provides:
(d) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in 
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer 
may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct 
with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith ef-
fort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.76
It can be argued that putting an exculpatory clause in a contract is not 
criminal or fraudulent, for the only consequence is that it is not enforcea-
ble. Nevertheless, it is clearly misleading, for if the clause is not enforcea-
ble, then it is in the contract only for in terrorem effect, and may lead the 
contracting party to believe that he or she has given up the right to bring 
suit. In a consumer case, this could be an unfair or deceptive act or practice 
under a Consumer Protection Act.77 The attorney including the clause in a 
contract might find support in the final clause of the Model Rule, which 
74. Id. at 347.
75. See Bailey Kuklin, On the Knowing Inclusion of Unenforceable Contract and Lease Terms, 56 
U. CIN. L. REV. 845 (1988).
76. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (1983).
77. See, e.g., Mont. Code Ann. § 30-14-103 (2011).
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states that a lawyer “may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith 
effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the 
law.”78 In Montana, it is arguably necessary to put the clause in a contract 
in order to get the test case that might induce the court to review its deci-
sion in Miller.
The spouse of a truck driver recently told me that instead of asking her 
to agree to an exculpatory clause, her husband’s employer told her that she 
had to provide her own insurance. Recall that this is the justification for the 
exculpatory clause in a contract for medical services, with the risk under-
taken by the party who exculpates the other. But would this work universal-
ly as a risk-shifting mechanism? If my insurer paid me for losses resulting 
from another’s negligence, then the insurer would have a right of subroga-
tion to pursue the tortfeasor. But the tortfeasor would have against the in-
surance company all the defenses that it would have against me, including 
the exculpatory clause. If insurers knew that they were going to lose their 
subrogation rights because the insured had agreed to an enforceable excul-
patory clause, would not they refuse to insure that risk? This may suggest 
another flaw in the Nudge argument.
VI. A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
In Boilerplate, Radin broadly condemns exculpatory clauses as part of 
“a boilerplate rights deletion scheme.”79 Radin’s blanket condemnation of 
exculpatory clauses does as much of a disservice to the richness of contract 
law as her blanket use of the word boilerplate. Heretofore, boilerplate has 
been used to describe the miscellaneous terms at the end of the contact that 
are similar in all contracts, as opposed to the operative terms that differ 
from transaction to transaction.80 Radin is of course correct that in a pre-
printed form contract, the operative terms are just as non-negotiable as the 
boilerplate terms, and therefore similar to them. But we already have a 
perfectly good term for such a contract—a contract of adhesion.
Similarly, Radin’s blanket condemnation of exculpatory clauses does 
not recognize that there is room for freedom of contract:
If the real argument in support of allowing firms to exculpate themselves 
from tort liability for their own negligence is not this weak efficiency ar-
gument but is simply an argument based on “freedom of contract,” one 
would expect to find courts making a distinction between how they eval-
78. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (1983).
79. The phrase is defined as “the deployment of boilerplate to rework a system of recipients’
rights that are guaranteed by the polity in order to divest recipients of those rights, or of some substan-
tial portion of them, for the benefit of a firm.” Radin, supra note 54, at 33.
80. See, e.g., SCOTT J. BURNHAM, DRAFTING AND ANALYZING CONTRACTS 235 (3d ed. 2003).
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uate such a clause in a commercial contract between parties who have 
apparently engaged in cognizant risk allocation versus how they evaluate 
it in a boilerplate rights deletion scheme.81
But courts such as the California Supreme Court have shown that they are 
often willing to make such a distinction. The approach used by California 
in Tunkl provides the means for a more nuanced approach to the problem.
An example of Radin’s overly zealous condemnation is found in her 
statement that “the UCC has a stringent rule of partial market-inalienability 
for consequential damages for personal injury caused by a product.”82 She 
uses this rule to support an argument that “[c]ourts are free to hold, and in 
some cases they should hold, that service providers as well as product pro-
viders cannot easily and as a matter of course exculpate themselves for 
causing personal injury.”83 The fact that the UCC rule is indeed one of 
partial market-inalienability weakens the analogy between the UCC provi-
sion and exculpatory clauses. The limitation of liability that she refers to 
in § 2-719(3) only applies to consumer goods, and even there the limitation 
is only “prima facie unconscionable”—presumably rebuttable.84
A good example of a nuanced analysis of UCC § 2-719(3) is found in 
Mullan v. Quickie Aircraft Corp.85 The defendant sold an airplane kit to the 
plaintiff, who was subsequently injured when the plane crashed. When the 
buyer sued for negligence, the seller claimed that a disclaimer of liability 
shielded it from personal injuries. In a thoughtful opinion, the court first 
looked at procedural unconscionability. It determined that the buyer was 
not in an unequal bargaining position because he negotiated the contract 
and had other sellers to choose from.86 Furthermore, the language was clear 
and free of legalese.87
In looking at substantive unconscionability, the federal court looked to 
the law of Colorado. It found an instructive case in Jones v. Dressler, in 
which the plaintiff was injured when the plane carrying him to a parachute 
jump crashed.88 The defendant claimed that an exculpatory clause shielded 
it and the court analyzed factors similar to those in the Tunkl test.89 The 
81. Radin, supra note 54, at 140.
82. Id. at 184.
83. Id.
84. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (2011) (“Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the 
limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person 
in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is 
commercial is not.”).
85. 797 F.2d 845, 848-53 (10th Cir. 1986).
86. Id. at 851-852.
87. Id. at 852.
88. 623 P.2d 370 (Colo. 1981).
89. Mullan, 797 F.2d at 850-53.
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Mullan court conducted a similar analysis and concluded that because the 
contract did not affect the public interest, the exculpatory clause was not 
void as a matter of public policy.90 Mullan’s claim for personal injury was 
barred in spite of the UCC provision.91
Analysis of the facts of a case in the light of the Tunkl test will provide
a nuanced approach to the enforceability of exculpatory clauses, but that 
approach will be improved if courts ignore the letter of Tunkl in favor of its 
spirit and look at the six tests as elements rather than as factors.
V. ANATOMY OF AN EXCULPATORY CLAUSE
We will now turn to an analysis of the skydiving contract, which is re-
printed in the Appendix. Based on the foregoing discussion, one would 
expect a contract in which the drafter wished to get maximum value from 
the exculpatory clause to have the following characteristics:
? Assent to the exculpatory clause should be demonstrated ob-
jectively
? The dangers of the activity should be acknowledged, and bet-
ter yet, described with particularity
? The clause itself should exculpate only from ordinary negli-
gence and not from gross negligence or intentional acts
? The clause should be written in Plain English
Let us explore one particular exculpatory clause to see the extent to 
which a sophisticated operator adheres to these recommendations. Recall 
that my analysis of exculpatory clauses was inspired by my skydiving ex-
perience. My exploration of this contract, however, proved to be not as 
easy as it should have been.
A van met the prospective jumpers at a designated location in a strip 
mall to take us to the airport. While we waited for everyone to arrive, the 
driver distributed contracts for us to read and sign. When I turned mine in, I 
asked him if I could have a copy, and he said he would arrange that when 
we got to the office at the airport. During the twenty-minute drive to the 
airport, while we were captive in the van, we were shown a video in which 
a representative of the operator explained to us the steps we should take for 
our own safety and further warned us about the risks inherent in the activi-
ty.
When we got to the office, I again asked for a copy of the contract, but 
the office manager refused to give me a copy. I pointed out that a contract 
90. Id. at 852-53.
91. Id.
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is a mutual endeavor, and that one of its purposes is to guide the behavior 
of the parties in the future. I could not very well perform according to its 
terms in the future if I did not know what those terms were. I did not point 
this out at the time, but an additional argument is that provisions intended 
to have an in terrorem effect would lose their punch, if I was ignorant of 
them. This reasoning was apparently not persuasive, and he still refused to 
give me a copy.
In trying to figure out why they refused to provide a copy, I first 
thought that they were protecting their intellectual property by keeping it 
out of their competitors’ hands. But then I realized a more likely explana-
tion is that the work is not entitled to copyright protection, so the only way 
to protect it is to keep it out of circulation. Is it entitled to copyright protec-
tion? I do not think so. It is unlikely that a form contract is the kind of orig-
inal work that is entitled to copyright protection. Am I concerned that if my 
analysis is incorrect, I will face liability for copying it? Not really. If it is 
entitled to copyright protection, I think I am making a fair use of it since I 
am analyzing it for scholarly purposes. And if I am not making fair use of 
it, the damages for my infringement would likely be minimal because they 
did not put notice of a claim to copyright on the document and I made a 
good faith effort to determine whether my use was fair before I used it. The 
law review, however, appropriately shifted the risk of my being mistaken to 
me when the editors contractually asked me to warrant that in the process 
of writing this article I did not infringe any copyrights and asked me to 
agree to indemnify them for any loss resulting from breach of that warran-
ty. I know this because they let me have a copy of the contract.
The reader will find the skydiving contract in its entirety in the Ap-
pendix to this article. A copy fortuitously fell into my hands when I found a 
stack of them under the box in which I deposited my evaluation form and 
tip for my jump-mate (well done, Kevin).
Through this contract, the company does a thorough job of warning 
me of the dangers of the transaction, and preparing me for the fact that I 
will have no recourse in the event of injury. The first thing one notices is 
the words “DANGER” and “WARNING” splashed across each page. Thus, 
the reasonable patron would have a hard time arguing that he or she did not 
know that he or she was about to undertake an activity that was not risk-
free.
Right at the top it says, with lots of capital letters, underlining, and ex-
clamation points to make sure it is called to my attention:
RELEASE OF RIGHTS & LIABILITY— ASSUME SELF-
RESPONSIBILITY CONTRACT
2014] CONTRACTING AWAY YOUR RIGHTS 399
WARNING!!!—EXTREME & SIGNIFICANT RISK & 
DANGER!!!!—WARNING!!!
After some mundane stuff, the contract states the grim statistics (“Fa-
tality Ratio = 1:75,000”) and again warns me of the dangers. Although 
some courts want the provider of the activity to enumerate the things that 
can go wrong in detail, here the company tells me generally that “[a]ll of 
the potential & significant risks, dangers, & possible tragic or fatal results 
which may occur cannot be expressed, forseen [sic], or predicted.”
There follows the first checkbox I have to think about. It initially re-
minds me of what seems to be obvious—that I do not have to skydive or 
sign the contract. This is followed by the first explicit language of exculpa-
tion, though it is not particularly conspicuous: “I know that if I sign this 
contract, I am absolving the ‘Released Entities’ of all Liability, Responsi-
bility, & Duty of Care.” This language is followed by my choice either to 
pay an extra $500 and not sign, “this binding contract,” or pay nothing 
extra and sign, “this legal contract of my own free will.” I assume this dif-
ference in language is not significant—I do not think there is a difference 
between a binding contract and a legal contract, and I think free will is 
implied in choice “A”.
This provision should be clearer, but I think what the company is try-
ing to say is that I can pay an extra $500 and hold them liable for their neg-
ligence—like the choice in the medical service agreement advocated in 
Nudge, except that this provision is designed so that no one will choose the 
right to sue, especially since the $500 cost of that right is almost twice the 
cost of the jump itself. It is confusing that this section starts off by telling 
me that “I do not have to skydive or sign this contract,” for I gather that if I 
pay the $500 I do in fact get to skydive. And I have a contract to do that, 
just one that does not give me the right to sue. If the purpose of the extra 
fee is to enable the company to purchase insurance, then they are not help-
ing themselves by discouraging the purchase of the right to sue. All of 
which makes me wonder if they have in fact purchased insurance. None of 
us wants to pay an extra $500, so I choose “Option B” and move on.
The next provision consists of representations that I do not have health 
issues. I assume that if I reveal too much here, I will not get to jump, so I 
keep it to the minimum and initial it.
The final provision on this page says it contains an “Affirmed 
Pledge.” I have no idea what that is, nor do I see anything in the provision 
that resembles that species. In that section, I agree to do various things in 
connection with the “Covered Activities.” It is a bit of struggle to find that 
defined term, but I finally located it in Paragraph 1d:
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1d. All Forms of Direct or In-direct Participation, Association, or be-
ing within close Proximity to: Ground & Air Transport, Aviation, 
Training, Skydiving, Parachuting, Tandem Jumping, Rigging, Observ-
ing, & all other Related, Component, Voluntary, Optional, &/or Re-
quired Activities, including interference from each, & attempts at Rescue 
or First Aid, are all intentionally & specifically integrated in this Contact 
& shall now be referred to inclusively & collectively as the “Covered
Activities”.
It seems to cover everything. The final sentence in that provision must be 
important, because it is in bold print and underlined. It also continues the 
German tradition of capitalizing words here and there: “‘My’ actual Exit 
or Jump out of an Airplane will be a physical demonstration of ‘My’ 
Acceptance & Agreement with this Contract.” I have no idea what that 
means. I assume that the document I am signing is a bilateral contract, in 
which the company and I have both made promises. This language, on the 
other hand, makes it sound like I have been offered a unilateral contract—
an offer to be accepted by performing an act—and jumping constitutes that 
act. But if that is the case, then not jumping would be not accepting. Since 
the “Covered Activities,” include more than the jump—e.g., the ride in the 
airplane itself—I would assume the company wants me to be bound even if 
I chicken out and do not jump. If it is a unilateral contract, then here is the 
acceptance:
The second page starts with some numbered paragraphs. Paragraph 1a 
is captioned: “THESE ENTITIES & ACTIVITIES ARE COVERD BY 
THIS CONTRACT.” I assume the intention was for that heading to go with 
Paragraph 1, of which “subsection a” is the entity represented by me. There 
I find that I am not only me, but “I, me, my, mine, myself; but also as the 
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customer, student, passenger, observer, jumper, skydiver, associate, or 
participant.” This definition seems like overkill, as the agreement makes 
no other reference to me as mine, customer, student, passenger, observer, 
jumper, skydiver, or associate, or participant.
Furthermore, I am not only signing as myself in these capacities but 
also “as the only legal representative of my: “person, property, estate, 
heirs, beneficiaries, dependents, children, relatives, or spouse”, if any.”
What does this mean and why is some of it in quotes? I vaguely remember 
from law school that nemo est haeres viventis, something to the effect that I 
do not have heirs while I am alive. I gather the intention is to remind me 
that I might be dead in a few minutes, and I should consider the needs of all 
these folks who I am leaving without a claim on my behalf. But is this pur-
porting to say that I am signing away their rights? Can I do that without 
their consent?
On page 1, we saw the first hint that I am exculpating the “Released 
Entities.” Now in Paragraph 1b, we see that these entities are defined as 
including the following (in enumerated form for grater readability and 
bolding left on those that were originally bolded):
SkydiveLasVegas.com LLC,
Skydive Las Vegas,
the City of Boulder City,
Boulder City Municipal Airport,
BFE LLC,
Boulder City Airport Properties LLC,
Volatile Aero Ventures LLC,
Volatile Air Ventures LLC,
Volatile Sky Ventures LLC,
Volatile Sky Sports LLC,
Brent Buckner,
Pacific Aerospace Limited,







the United States Parachute Association,
all Travel, Tour, & Ticket Sellers,
















We shall have occasion shortly to attempt to count these entities, but for 
now all we are interested in is the definition. The sentence is odd, however, 
for after this enumeration it picks up with:
[I]ncluding but not limited to all of their Singular or Collective: Inabili-
ties, Failures, Short Comings, Bad Judgments, Wrong Decisions, Mis-
takes, Actions or Inactions, Errors or Omissions, & all forms of 
Oversight & Simple or Gross Negligence, all of which are intentionally 
& specifically included in this Contract, & shall now be referred to in-
clusively & collectively as the “Released Entities”.
I assume the intention here was to tell me that I have exculpated the 
released entities. Instead, their mistakes, negligence, etc. are all defined as 
part of the “Released Entities,” which makes no sense. I think it unlikely 
that a court would find that the definition is sufficient to do the substantive 
work of exculpating the entities. Furthermore, the drafter has made the 
mistake of attempting to release from “Gross Negligence.” That is a no-no, 
and if the provision is deemed to be an exculpatory clause, its breadth may 
be fatal to the effort. Most courts that enforce exculpatory clauses enforce 
them only if they exculpate a party from simple negligence.92 By including 
gross negligence, the drafter has run the risk of having the exculpatory 
clause thrown out as overly broad. It could be saved by severance of those 
words, so a severability provision might also be helpful, but the contract 
does not contain one.
92. Kuzmiak v. Brookchester, Inc., 33 N.J. Super. 575 passim (App. Div. 1955).
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In Paragraph 1c, I agree that everyone is an independent contractor 
and not liable for the actions of the others. All well and good, but either 
they are or they are not and my agreeing that they are, is not going to make 
them so.
Paragraph 1d is the definition of “Covered Activities” that was first 
used on page 1 and henceforth will be used a number of times in the 
agreement.
Paragraph 2 (TANDEM HARNESS ADJUSTMENTS, & CLOSE 
PERSONAL CONTACT) starts off fairly sensibly. It indicates with par-
ticularity what I can expect as a normal part of this activity, so I will not be 
taken by surprise. It seems to go too far, however, when it says, “I hereby 
accept this process and absolve the ‘Released Entities’ from any claims of 
inappropriate physical or sexual contact, abuse, or harassment.” What is 
intended is that I should not make a claim merely because of contact that is 
a normal part of the activity. But to release all claims goes too far, for there 
could be inappropriate contact that is not a normal part of the activity.
Paragraph 3 informs me that there is no insurance coverage for me and 
that I should obtain my own insurance to cover the people listed in Subsec-
tion 1a in the event of my death or injury. This one also seems sensible. 
This is not to say that the covered entities are not covered by insurance, 
however.
Paragraph 4 is right out of a contract for the sale or lease of goods, and 
probably effectively disclaims the implied warranty of merchantability and 
fitness for a particular purpose to the extent this is a sale of goods under 
Article 2 or a lease of goods under Article 2A. Most jurisdictions would 
find it is not, for the principal purpose of the transaction is to make a jump, 
of which use of the parachute is incidental.93 Once again, someone is fond 
of unilateral contracts for the provision states that “Use of the ‘Released 
Entities’ items, equipment, & aircraft shall be deemed to be ‘My’ admis-
sion & endorsement as to its safe & acceptable condition.” This again 
seems like overkill. If I have signed an effective disclaimer, then it does not 
matter that I use it. This does not make it any more of a disclaimer. The 
final sentence is probably a good idea: “No one has any expressed or im-
plied authority to make any warranty, representation, or guarantee of any 
nature on behalf of the ‘Released Entities’, nor to exclude or limit the effect 
of this disclaimer.” This operates to remind me that nothing anyone says to 
me counts. That statement should be coupled with a merger clause to help 
exclude parol evidence, but a merger clause is curiously lacking.
93. Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974).
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Like a number of the other provisions, Paragraph 5a almost comes out 
and has me exculpate others from their negligence but it does not quite say 
that. It makes sure that I understand there will be risks. I then agree to ac-
cept all of those risks. But the drafter again goes too far, for I accept those 
risks “regardless of any results being Foreseen or Unforeseen, Intentional 
or Accidental, Contemplated or not Contemplated, Obvious or Hidden, 
or through Omission or Commission.” A previous section had me give 
up claims for gross negligence. This one has me accept the risk even if it is 
“intentional . . . contemplated, . . . or through Commission.” I very much 
doubt that a court is going to agree that I accepted the risk that the company 
was going to throw me out of a plane with the intention of killing me. And 
if the provision goes too far, this might be fatal to the entire attempt at ex-
culpation.
Similarly, in Paragraph 5b, I assume all responsibility for what hap-
pens. This provision is helpful in letting me know specifically what might 
go wrong, but again it goes too far when I agree to be responsible for “ac-
tive or passive Simple or Gross Negligence.”
In Paragraph 6, we finally get to the straightforward exculpatory 
clause. It is pretty well drafted, for it indicates that I know the “Significant 
Risks & Dangers,” which have been pointed out to me in other provisions. 
But it may also go too far in having me agree to exculpate from gross neg-
ligence.
Even if an entity has an exculpatory clause in its contract, the excul-
pated entity does not like to be sued, because it can cost a lot of money just 
to defend the suit. Therefore, the next few provisions try to discourage me 
from bringing suit. Paragraph 7, is straightforward in getting me to agree 
not to seek compensation or sue the Released Entities. Paragraph 8a, 
among other things, tells me that I will have to pay the attorney fees of the 
Released Entities, which can be another disincentive to bring a suit. But the 
mother of all in terrorem clauses trying to keep me from bringing suit is the 
liquidated damages clause in Paragraph 8b:
8b. IF “I” TAKE PART IN ANY LAWSUIT, I WILL PAY $50,000 IN 
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
If “I” take any part in any Lawsuit, for any reason against the “Released 
Entities”, “I” agree to pay $50,000 in Liquidated Damages to each of the 
“Released Entities” immediately upon the filing of any Legal Action, & 
regardless of any future outcome. I agree that the liquidated damages are 
not a penalty, but rather a down payment towards the damages that I will 
be causing the “Released Entities.”
Liquidated damages clauses are favored by economists but not by 
many courts. However, everyone agrees that the purpose of a liquidated 
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damages clause is for the parties to make the lawsuit more efficient by 
agreeing to the amount of damages in advance. Therefore, the amount must 
represent the anticipated loss. In this provision, the damages are payable on 
bringing a lawsuit, not on finding that a cause of action has been proven. It 
seems, therefore, that these “damages” are those that result from my having 
breached my Paragraph 7 promise not to bring a lawsuit. The amount of 
these liquidated damages is $50,000 per entity. The drafter must have 
known that the first rule of tort law seems to be “sue everyone in sight.” As 
we saw in the definition of Released Entities, here there are at least twenty-
seven potential defendants to choose from. If I brought a claim against a 
modest ten of them, then I would have to fork over $500,000 on bringing 
the suit. Is that an unreasonable amount? Apparently not, for I freely stated 
that “I agree that the liquidated damages are not a penalty, but rather a 
down payment towards the damages that I will be causing the ‘Released 
Entities.’” These are odd liquidated damages, indeed, for I have not only 
agreed that they are not a penalty, but I have also agreed that this is not 
even a liquidation of the damages; it is merely a down payment. So, pre-
sumably, the entities intend to recover their actual damages in spite of the 
presence of the liquidated damages clause. Curiously, the agreement does 
not otherwise state that “I” am responsible for the legal fees of the prevail-
ing party.
Paragraph 9 is a hodgepodge. I agree that the contract and videos may 
be used as evidence to show that I voluntarily consented to the Contract. I 
would assume there is no reason those would be excluded from evidence. 
The next sentence turns the interpretive world upside-down: “If a Court 
should decide that any part of this Contract is unclear or un-enforceable, I 
agree that (a) any uncertainty shall be construed in a manner most favora-
ble to the ‘Released Entities.’” The standard rule of interpretation is contra 
proferentem—the instrument is to be construed against the party who draft-
ed it. The goal of contract interpretation is to ascertain the intention of the 
parties. Contra proferentem does not really serve that goal, for unlike the 
other rules, it does not represent an attempt to discover that intent. Rather, 
it resolves what would otherwise be a tie by putting the blame on the party 
who caused the ambiguity to arise through their drafting. It makes no sense 
to try to change that rule. First of all, in the event of ambiguity, the contract 
should be interpreted using all rules of interpretation in order to ascertain 
its meaning. Second, if those interpretive devices all fail, there is no reason 
to interpret it against me, who was blameless in its drafting. Can I freely 
agree to take the fall for the drafter? If I were the court, I would not let the 
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parties dictate to me what rules of interpretation I can use as a matter of 
law.94
The next sentence tells me that contract remains in effect, which is fi-
ne, and that it is legally binding upon everyone listed in Paragraph 1a, 
which is nonsense, since I do not have authority to bind them. It also has a 
no oral modification clause and a choice of venue and choice of law clause, 
which are probably fine.
For purposes of showing procedural unconscionability, Paragraph 10 
is a classic. Not only do I agree to exculpate the Released Entities, but to 
show that I read and understood that provision, I actually have to write it 
out in longhand. I have no objection to this technique, and agree that it 
might show my agreement in the sense that I knew it was in the contract, 
but I am not sure that writing it shows my understanding any more than 
reading it did. In Montana, where courts love to throw out contract terms 
because people did not read or understand them, I was asked by someone to 
sign a letter on his behalf. This letter stated that I, as an attorney, affirmed 
that he had read and understood the terms! I was willing to affirm that he 
had read them, that I had explained them to him, and that he said he under-
stood them, but whether he understood them would require me to construct 
some sort of measure and I was not willing to affirm that based just on his 
say-so.
The next page contains a bunch of details connected with the jump 
procedures that do not have much legal consequence. But there are many 
more opportunities for me to initial to show my agreement. The final para-
graph just above my signature line contains a lot of legal stuff:
I AM AT LEAST 18 YEARS OLD AND HAVE SEEN AND HEARD 
THE “LEGAL CONTRACT VIDEO”. I UNDERSTAND THE ABOVE 
INSTRUCTIONS & TRAINING. I HAVE CAREFULLY READ THIS 
CONTRACT; AGREE WITH ITS COMMITMENTS & AM SIGNING 
OF MY OWN FREE WILL WITHOUT DURESS. I HAVE NO 
QUESTIONS AND I AM READY TO JUMP. I UNDERSTAND BY 
SIGNING THIS LEGAL CONTRACT I AM FOREVER GIVING UP 
IMPORTANT LEGAL RIGHTS AND IT IS MY DESIRE TO DO SO.
So how does this attempt at exculpation measure up? If I were a judge, 
I would first apply the Tunkl test as elements, as I have argued it should be 
applied, and I would find that this is a private activity that I was free not to 
participate in, so an exculpatory clause is appropriate. I would also find that 
I manifested a real assent to the agreement and that the dangers of the ac-
tivity were brought home to me. The terms were communicated to me in 
94. See Scott J. Burnham, Contracting Around Contra Proferentem, 3 THE TRANSACTIONAL 
LAWYER 6 (June 2013).
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plain English. However, I would be troubled by the fact that the clause 
went beyond exculpation from ordinary negligence, and on that basis I 
would throw it out.
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APPENDIX: A SKYDIVING CONTRACT
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